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ABSTRACT
In this article, I examine the relationship between engagement and 
political institutions by using the example of the creation and development 
of the ombudsman institution. The article starts with the short introduction 
to key theoretical views about institutions, political institutions and 
institutionalization. Then, I concentrate on how political institutions 
change, i.e. whether they can be changed through social engagement 
and whether and when we can actually say that they are originally created 
by an engagement. By using the case of ombudsman, I explore if political 
institutions can engage themselves and under what conditions, that is, 
whether are institutions characterized by in-built permanent reflexivity 
possible.
Both engagement and political institutions can be considered essentially con-
tested concepts. In case of political institutions (at least in their contemporary 
form), such debate lasts for decades, while “engagement” is still in its academ-
ic childhood. However, both concepts are characterized by “openness towards 
infinite debate, endless interpretations of meaning and the valence of the giv-
en term” (Sladeček 2008: 8; see Gallie 1956). While citizens and social groups 
regularly engage with political institutions, the opposite is not that usual. The 
former often seek change, while the latter are most comfortable with status quo. 
Politics is at the heart of engagement as its inalienable and necessary fea-
ture. That is why we intuitively connect engagement with external changes of 
political institutions. However, one may decide to engage with the institutions, 
“from within the system, with the aim of bettering or battering it“ (Zaharijević 
2016: 314). With this article, I aim to problematize this thesis. My intention is 
to offer one possible way of thinking about engagement and political institu-
tions. Taking into account the scope of the article, my plan is to examine the 
link between political institutions and engagement by using the example of 
the ombudsman institution. 
The article starts with the short introduction to key theoretical views about 
institutions, political institutions and institutionalization, bearing in mind a full 
plethora of different definitions and their interpretations. I then concentrate 
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on how political institutions change, i.e. whether they can be changed through 
social engagement and whether and when can we actually say they are origi-
nally created through an engagement. By using the case of the ombudsman, I 
explore if political institutions can engage on their own and under what con-
ditions, i.e. are institutions characterized by in-built permanent reflexivity 
possible? (IFDT, internet).
Institutions in Social Sciences 
If institutions are regarded as central in a social science discipline, it is in po-
litical science. However, frequency of the usage of that term in political sci-
ence is in disproportion with the number of attempts to define them. Political 
scientists sometimes act like the meaning of this term is self-evident and that 
we recognize an institution as soon as we see one. This is even more curious 
because, as noted by Rothstein, “whichever story political scientists want to 
tell, it will be a story about institutions“ (1996: 134–135). 
Political science publications in early post WWII period did not even men-
tion the term „institution“. As observed by Truman in 1962, “the word [institu-
tion] does not have a meaning sufficiently precise to enable one to state with 
confidence that one group is an institution whereas another is not” (1962: 26). 
Interestingly, behaviorists during their wave in 1960s and 1970s had not denied 
that institutions had had a role. However, they introduced “broader” notions 
of structure (Almond and Coleman 1960) or system (Easton 1965), without 
abandoning the usage of “institutions“ and by avoiding to define institutions 
in the first place. Not even Sartori’s “Social Science Concepts” from 1984 nor 
Finer’s three-volume “History of Government“ from 1999 offered a clear defi-
nition of institution.
March and Olsen have transformed the debate about institutions with their 
“The New Institutionalism” (1984) and “Rediscovering Institutions” (1989). 
Their goal was “to explore some ways in which the institutions of politics, 
particularly administrative institutions, provide order and influence change 
in politics“ (March and Olsen 1989: 16). Nevertheless, they have successfully 
avoided to define those institutions and opted only to list some concrete ex-
amples of institutions.
If we try to compare the meaning of institutions in political science with 
those in economy and sociology, it appears to be a dimension, with economics 
and political science at the two extremes and sociology somewhere in the middle 
(Blondel 2008: 722). Sociologists see them as both organizations and activities; 
political scientists look at them almost exclusively as organizations, while for 
economists they are mostly procedures. For instance, North opens his influ-
ential study “Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance” 
by saying „institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, 
are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (1990: 3).
Economists are primarily concerned with solving the problem of individual 
choice; thus, they focus on rules. Тhe individuals are the agents of the economic 
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“machine” and cannot be expected to achieve their goals unless there are rules 
that determine how they are to relate to each other (Goodin and Klingemann 
1996: 11). The situation is different in larger society, as individuals form dif-
ferent associations which constrain them. Institutions cannot just be based on 
rules; they have to include the way collective arrangements affect the behavior 
of individuals. Social analysis has to be based both on the choice of individuals 
and on what might be regarded as the “pressure” of the groups to which these 
individuals belong (Blondel 2008: 722). This is why looking at institutions as 
both organizations and procedures is particularly important.
If we take that politics is essentially a process of decision-making, it should 
be noted that such process takes place not between individuals but in commu-
nities and is applicable to those who belong to these communities, whether 
they participated or not in the decisions or indeed even agreed to them. This 
is why Easton underlines that politics has to be an “authoritative” process of 
decision-making (1953: 135–41). 
Given that decisions are mostly being made within organizations, they are 
of utmost relevance for political science’s approach to institutions. However, 
that does not mean that institutions seen as rules and procedures are irrele-
vant for political science. Rules are part of institutional process, but in pol-
itics those rules and procedures are applied, mainly, through organizations, 
because they have to be applicable to large numbers who have not participated 
in the decision-making process. To that end, only if rules and procedures are 
“legitimized” by an organization whose “authority” the individual is prepared 
to recognize can they be also recognized (Blondel 2008: 723).
North observes that “[b]roadly speaking, political rules in place lead to eco-
nomic rules” (1990: 48). Similar applies to the social field, as well. Some small 
social groups may function and operate rather independently of wider political 
processes, i.e. without having to call on the “authority” of the state. Nonetheless, 
in politics, the recourse to authority is continuous and universal; only in politics 
are organizations always on the front line, as rules and procedures, however im-
portant, have to be defended and supported by organizations (Blondel 2008: 723). 
Institutionalization
Even if we manage to offer some kind of definition of institutions, the next 
question is almost self-posing: how do they emerge? Do political, social, or 
economic “arrangements” become institutions automatically and immediate-
ly? Or do they develop in institutions after time passes?
In fact, the issue of institutionalization has concerned political scientists 
even more than institutions as such. Huntington devoted considerable time on 
this question. He defined institutions as “organizations and procedures which 
acquire value and stability”(1968: 13). With that, he indicated that this process 
takes place over time, i.e. it cannot be immediate.
In literature, institutionalization is mostly studied as “internal process”. 
Huntington sees time as a critical factor for the maturity of an institution. To 
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him, that process is more or less linear, i.e. time is viewed as being by itself one 
of the “causes” of institutionalization (1968: 13). In other words, “the longer an 
organization or procedure has been in existence, the higher the level of insti-
tutionalization” (Huntington 1968: 13–14). Huntington thus sees this process 
as exclusively internal. He is not alone in observing institutionalization only 
from the perspective of internal problems. Goodin and others in “The Theory 
of Institutional Design” (1996), published almost thirty years after Hunting-
ton’s work, also neglect external influences of institutional breakdown. Here, 
I particularly think of those who are in a way dependent on some institution, 
but have lost confidence and trust in it. 
Support is important for political institutions and is one of the reasons why 
institutionalization as a process can hardly be looked exclusively as linear. In 
fact, external influences can reverse institutionalization as well. It is hard to 
deny that some support at least is necessary for political institutions to be 
maintained. Such support is indeed subject to fluctuations. 
Blondel rightly observes that while the introduction of support in the equa-
tion renders the analysis of institutionalization in politics more realistic, it 
seems to complicate further the question of a definition of institutions in the 
political context. This is because the question arises as to whether political in-
stitutions can be examined independently from the support which they might 
enjoy, i.e. is a political organization or procedure still an institution even if it 
does not have support or has only very little support? (2008: 728)
While support is important, it should be not seen as precondition to the 
very existence of political institutions, particularly if we define them as orga-
nizations or procedures characterized by “stable, valued, recurring patterns 
of behaviour” (Goodin 1996: 21). Support seems both extraneous and irrele-
vant to these characteristics. The way in which the institutional arrangement 
is shaped is not dependent on external support for such arrangement. More-
over, if support is brought into the picture, since support is never “total,” the 
question arises as to what is the threshold below which the extent of support 
would be too small for the arrangement to be an institution. Governments, 
parliaments, political parties and constitutions all exist as institutions even if 
they enjoy very little support and have to rely on coercion to survive. Howev-
er, it is also doubtful as to whether, in the extreme case of the near-complete 
collapse of such bodies, one can still refer to them as “institutions”. In circum-
stances when the government of a regime on the verge of collapse, it is clearly 
“de-institutionalized. As Blondel argues, such a government seems therefore 
to be no more than a “pseudo-institution” (2008: 728).
How Do Political Institutions Change
As indicated, majority of scholars see institutions as relatively enduring char-
acteristics of political and social life (rules, norms, procedures) which structure 
behavior and cannot be changed easily. Gérard Roland introduced a classifica-
tion of “slow-moving” and “fast-moving” institutions (2004), which might be 
ENGAGING INSTITUTIONS │ 497
useful for our discussion. The former generally change slowly, incrementally, 
and continuously, whereas the latter are more given to rapid, discontinuous 
change in large steps (2004: 116). The latter can be changed overnight. Roland 
uses an earthquake as an analogy to explain the difference between two. Pres-
sures along fault lines build up continuously but slowly, then suddenly provoke 
an earthquake that abruptly changes the topography of a given area. Slow-mov-
ing institutions are the equivalent of these tectonic pressures; fast-moving in-
stitutions are the equivalent of the topography (2004: 117).
According to this scholar, social norms are an example of slow-moving in-
stitutions. While some social norms and values can change very rapidly in his-
torical terms (e.g. a society’s tolerance for cigarettes), in general, social norms 
and values change slowly. An important reason why social norms and values 
are changing slowly is the fact that they cannot be changed by an authoritative 
decision. To that end, legal systems tend to be faster-moving institutions than 
social norms but slower-moving than political institutions. A given law can be 
changed overnight, but the effectiveness of the legal system and the enforce-
ment of laws depend on their acceptance and legitimacy in society and on the 
expectations of many actors (Roland 2004: 116).
The degree of centralization and power concentration has important im-
plications not only for institutional experimentation but also for the nature 
and speed of political change. Roland underlines that political institutions that 
concentrate power in the hands of a few tend toward patterns of infrequent 
and abrupt change because, relative to institutions in which power is more dis-
persed, institutions with concentrated power leave more room for discretionary 
behavior and abuse of power by those holding office (2004: 122). Consequent-
ly, the high economic stakes of political power in centralized regimes tend to 
translate into a more pronounced temptation to resort to coercive methods to 
retain power (Roland 2004: 122).
For further discussion about relationship between political institutions and 
engagement, it is significant to note that so-called new institutionalism, as well 
as different approaches that developed from and in relations with it, start from 
an assumption that political institutions are moderately conservative, because 
they have reserves towards the changes that do not align with their goals (Vranić 
2012). Institutions are autonomous, whereas the nature of their changes is ex-
ternal, while at the same time resistance towards any change is inherent char-
acteristic of institutions (Vranić 2012: 249). Put differently, institutions can 
change from both internal and external factors, which gives us a solid foundation 
to further explore whether they can be changed as a result of an engagement.
Engagement
For the purpose of this article, my starting position for defining engagement is 
the one that looks at it as a collective action characterized by the following “dou-
ble movement”: 1) reflection on the existing social norms and rules, and conse-
quently, 2) acting upon or against their modification or change (IFDT, internet).
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If we compare definitions of institutions presented in first part of this ar-
ticle and this starting definition of engagement, we can even go that far to 
say that every engagement is essentially oriented towards institutions, be-
cause the notion is about reflection over existing social values, norms and 
rules, which together create the substance of an institution as a term. When 
these somewhat abstract elements of an institution are embodied, i.e. when 
they are given a formalized shape, we actually get an institution in the form 
of organization. In that sense, engagement is oriented towards the change of 
or preservation of an institution as both procedure and organization, depend-
ing on a concrete case. 
In addition to the view that engagement has to be a collective action, I will 
also test a hypothesis that engagement can be expressed through individual ac-
tion as well. In other words, I accept that social engagement exists when there 
is 1) reflection on the existing social norms and rules, and consequently, 2) per-
sonal or joint acting upon or against their modification or change.
While I think that engagement does not have to be a collective practice, I 
do accept that a reflection and call for the inclusion of others for the sake of 
fulfilment of the goals is indeed most often embedded in the engagement, i.e. 
action is “oriented towards inclusion of other in specific line of activity with-
out commitment or previous agreement” (Fiket and Ćeriman, 2018).
This upgrade of the definition of engagement is worthwhile because it spec-
ifies that it involves a specific line of activity, but without commitment. Here, 
it is important to specify what we consider under “commitment“, because, for 
instance, some sociologists, such as Howard Becker, actually define commit-
ment as “consistent line of activity” (Becker 1960). If we would accept Becker’s 
definition of commitment, our thesis would be anulled.
I do agree that engagement is not the same as commitment, i.e. social en-
gagement is not a synonym for joint commitment, as defined by Margaret Gil-
bert. Both concepts concur in underlining the importance of the will, given 
that joint commitment is in fact “commitment of the will“, while the will is the 
driver and the necessary prerequisite of engagement. However, they are not 
synonyms, since in Gilbert’s conception an individual cannot free himself/
herself of joint commitment; that has to be done by other members, because 
they have all committed by publicly expressed will. In that sense, joint commit-
ment is indeed a context for loyalty and its antithesis, betrayal (Gilbert 2013).
In terms of freeing of commitment, engagement is closer to individual (per-
sonal) commitment, in which an individual is in a position to free him/herself 
from his/her commitment simply by changing his mind (Gilbert 2013). The 
same case is with engagement, as there is no conditionality or limitation to an 
individual to simply change his/her mind.
The second notion of high relevance for both engagement and commit-
ment is accountability. Gilbert underlines that the parties are accountable to 
one another for any behavior that deviates from the course to which they are 
committed by virtue of the jointness of the commitment (Gilbert 2013). I be-
lieve that accountability is also embedded in engagement. When we present 
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some topic as one of public interest or common good, we actually call others 
to engage, we call them to act, for the well-being of community as such, we 
call them to join the fight for or against something. In that sense, engagement 
is indeed characterized by antagonism, or as put by Zaharijević, “substantial 
antagonism seems to be the core politicality of engagement“(2016: 314). Hence, 
if we say that engagement does not imply commitment in formal (legal) terms 
nor commitment to stay in that specific line of activity, then accountability 
is also not constituted in the same way as in joint commitment. Nonetheless, 
the call for action does contain subtext of essential obligation of politically 
conscious being to react; such call is indeed meant to influence willingness 
of others; it appeals to Kantian duty to oneself as such (ger. Pflicht gegen sich 
selbst), as reminded by Bojanić and Djordjević (2016: 451). The crucial differ-
ence is in the nature of such commitment, which is almost an integrated part 
of the call for action, but does not transform in guaranty of survival of joint 
engagement. 
For something to be characterized as joint and not personal engagement, 
it has to be based in reciprocity. To that end, I see every engaged act as, in es-
sence, a social act, as defined by Husserl, and not Reinach.1 Following Husserl, 
I insist on the importance of reciprocity for the creation of joint engagement, 
i.e. social act is an act, if one is doing something hoping that other will notice 
one’s intentions, and reply in their own way. For social act to be an act, there 
has to be a process of chaining, not mimesis (Bojanić and Ćipranić 2018: 31). 
Further on, engagement in every case asks for devotion and publicity, i.e. so-
cial engagement presupposes certain commitments to goals one sets to achieve 
(Cvejić 2016: 334). However, the question is what is the nature of those goals?
Fiket and Ćeriman in their research on academic female workers employed 
at the University of Belgrade emphasized that the orientation of engagement is 
always towards the common good (Fiket and Ćeriman, 2018). While in general, 
I agree with this view, I do have one dilemma. Is the common good a goal of en-
gagement or is the common good necessary starting motivator of engagement? 
Or are both necessary? In other words, where do the common good stand in 
the engagement equation; on which side of the equality sign – left or right? Or 
on both? Does the engagement exist when someone publicly and transparent-
ly express his/her goals as those of public interest (or as the common good) or 
when at the end of engagement, public interests are indeed achieved?
If we accept that the engaged act is characterized as such by the researcher, 
post festum, then one may ask where the common good has to be placed? We 
can think of situation when the engaged act was not originally motivated by 
the common good, but has ultimately resulted in the common good. Similarly, 
it is possible to think of situation when an engaged act was indeed oriented to-
wards the common good, but such common good was ultimately not achieved 
or it was warped during the engagement. Put differently, is the change of the 
nature of engagement from personal to common or vice versa possible during 
1  See more on this difference in: Bojanić and Ćipranić 2018.
ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF OMBUDSMAN500 │ LUKA GLUšAC
the engagement? Is that the same engagement or not? This dilemma seems to 
be particularly relevant for the engagement oriented towards the creation or 
the change of political institutions. 
When Can Political Institutions Be Created by Engagement 
If we say that some political institution is created by reflection of an individu-
al about existing norms, rules and organization of state power; and where that 
reflection was followed by successful action oriented towards their change, 
can we then say that such institution was created by engagement? This case is 
about individual initiative, which can be characterized as personal social en-
gagement, in sense that it is result of a private (single) evaluative perspective, 
as described by Cvejić (2017: 43).
If we add that above-mentioned individual was in fact a monarch – king, 
does that change anything? This situation is actually a description of the birth 
of the ombudsman institution.
At the end of the 17th century, Sweden was a major power in Europe with 
control over the Baltic Sea. In 1700, Russia, Denmark and Poland formed an al-
liance to defeat Sweden. The military prowess of Charles XII (ruled 1697–1718), 
a young inexperienced king, took the members of the alliance by surprise and, 
after his stunning victory, he earned the nickname ‘the Swedish Meteor’ (Dash 
2012). After that surprising victory over Peter the Great at the Battle of Narva 
in 1700, Charles dismissed requests by his allies to discuss peace treaties. After 
year of war, in 1709 Charles was ultimately defeated by Peter the Great at the 
Battle of Poltava, and his army was decimated. Wounded, Charles and his re-
maining men took refuge in the village near Bender, in present-day Moldova, 
at the invitation of the rulers of the Ottoman Empire, who were also enemies 
of Peter the Great. Having left Sweden in 1700 and having been away at war 
for nine years, Charles remained in Turkey and continued to rule from abroad 
while struggling to negotiate diplomatic and financial terms to ensure his safe 
return to Sweden (Lang 2011: 58).
During Charles’ exile in Turkey, Sweden was in crisis, suffering from pov-
erty, plagues, depletion of resources, danger of ongoing war and widespread 
corruption (Lang 2011: 59). Well aware that Sweden was in dire straits and 
guided by a coterie of advisors, Charles initiated a series of extensive policy 
and administrative reforms resulting in the decree for a major administrative 
reorganization signed on October 26, 1713 (Hatton 1968). The reforms includ-
ed a decree creating the institution of the King’s Ombudsman. According to 
Hatton, among many reforms recommended and implemented by Charles and 
his advisors, only one has endured: The Ombudsman (Hatton 1968).
His Majesty’s Ombudsman reported directly to Charles and was charged 
with ensuring that judges, civil servants and military staff acted in accordance 
with the law and the King’s wishes, with the power to initiate legal proceedings 
(Lang 2011: 62; Wieslander 1999: 13). This early version of the ombudsman was 
not an idea deliberately conceptualized to protect the rights of individuals, but 
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was born out of a crisis of governance and with the goal to preserve the King. 
To that end, we do not consider the creation of this institution as an act of en-
gagement, because its goal was not acting in public interest, neither it has in 
this phase resulted in the common good nor the public interest was ultimately 
met. While the establishment of the ombudsman at this stage contained some 
seeds of an attempt to improve administration, it was predominantly aimed 
at helping the survival of the King, and had not contributed to increased ac-
countability, transparency or democratization of the state power. 
However, further evolution of the ombudsman institution in Sweden sug-
gests that the second phase of its development may indeed be a result of en-
gagement. During the 18th century the Ombudsman was subjected to different 
transformation; its name and organization were changed multiple times. For 
instance, in May 1719, it was renamed the Chancellor of Justice (Justitiekans-
lern) and became an institution of Parliament rather than of the King. When, 
however, the King again became absolute ruler in the latter part of the 18th 
century, the institution returned to being associated with the executive (Or-
ton 2001: 2 in McKenna 2011). King Gustav IV, who ruled from 1792 to 1809, 
paid the price for his absolutism, and was overthrown in a military coup. The 
coupists brought to power his uncle, who became King Charles XIII. The King 
committed to introduce the parliamentary system in Sweden and to limit his 
own powers. As a result, new Swedish Constitution was introduced in 1809, 
and included the Parliamentary Ombudsman as an office independent of the 
Parliament. The position was established in connection with the adoption of 
the Instrument of Government and was influenced by Montesquieu and Locke’s 
ideas about the division of power, as well as some uniquely national influenc-
es (Wieslander 1999). A new constitution was introduced to balance executive 
power with the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament). It was determined that a Parlia-
mentary Ombudsman (Justitieombudsman) would be elected to oversee public 
administration enacted in accordance with the law. With that, the Ombuds-
man’s role was transformed to oversee the legality of work of administration 
and judiciary in the name of Parliament, and to contribute to legal, more fair 
and accountable state administration.
The same applies to further evolution of the ombudsman concept in Eu-
rope in second part of the 20th century. Context of the establishment of om-
budsman on Iberian Peninsula and post-socialist Europe was very similar to 
that in Sweden, despite the fact they are separated by 150 years. Public intel-
lectuals, civil society and political opposition called for the introduction of an 
ombudsman as an additional mechanism for oversight of the state authorities, 
and as one of guarantees of transition from authoritarian to democratic society. 
Today, comparatively the most spread ombudsman model is the one that 
explicitly has a mandate for the protection and promotion of human rights (so-
called hybrid model), in addition to fighting maladministration.2 This model 
originated from the Iberian Peninsula, as part of efforts to establish accountable 
2  More on ombudsman models, see in: Glušac 2016.
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democratic governance during 1970s after the breakdown of authoritarian re-
gimes and adoption of new constitutions. In Portugal and Spain ombudsmen3 
have been created within the framework of big constitutional reforms in the 
process of democratization. They have had double role: to protect and pro-
mote human rights in young and fragile democracy, and to serve as an im-
portant actor in its defense and prevention of return to authoritarian society 
(Glušac 2018a: 313).
In postsocialist Europe, ombudsmen have been developed as a democratic 
request in the process of transition. Integral element of democratic changes 
was transformation of existing and introduction of new institutions, such as 
ombudsmen. In the ombudsman context, that process started with the creation 
of the Ombudsman in Poland (1987), and was concluded with the election of 
the first Protector of Citizens (Ombudsman) in Serbia in 2007. The common 
characteristic of these institutions is that they have been designed as hybrid 
ombudsman models. Such combination was expected, given that all countries 
in transition have strived to establish efficient and accountable public admin-
istrations, and to strengthen institutional guarantees for the protection of hu-
man rights, which are often violated by state and para-state structures in the 
past. It should be mentioned that the introduction of ombudsman in political 
and legal systems of post-socialist countries was not synchronized nor easy. It 
was marked by noticeable resistance of all three traditional branches of power 
(Glušac 2018a: 314). Only under pressure from the public, academia, civil so-
ciety organizations and international instances had the states adopted legis-
lation giving the ombudsman a broad and strong mandate. The executive had 
struggled to accept that independent mechanisms for oversight of its work has 
been established, as the public administration was not used to such scrutiny, 
while the judiciary in some states had perceived the ombudsman as competi-
tion, which is certainly not the case. In states where the ombudsman was giv-
en the right to oversee the judiciary, in terms of the respect of the set of rights 
to access to justice (as in Poland), the resistance of the courts was even stron-
ger (Glušac 2018a: 314).
The evolution of the ombudsman institution confirms the thesis that system 
seeks self-sustainability and provides almost a reflexive resistance to any change, 
especially structural. The establishment of the ombudsman, and especially its 
constitutionalization, has changed the existing institutional architecture, and 
therefore elements of the existing system. Thus, following the development 
of the ombudsman institution, we can say that although the motive (goal) of 
its original establishment was personal, its final outcome is public, social. Its 
existence is in public interest. Efficient ombudsman is indeed the common 
good, in sense that this institution does not work in the interests of the rul-
ers. On contrary, the institution has been transformed so as to control them.
3  The term Ombudsman is gender-neutral, as the ‘man’ suffix itself is gender-neutral 
in original Swedish. That is, it applies correctly whether the Ombudsman is male or fe-
male. Following that, we use ‘ombudsmen’ in plural throughout this article.
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Whether and under which Conditions Can Political Institutions 
Be Engaged Themselves
Zaharijević asks where do the engaged stand, spatially and temporarily? Do 
they stand in the streets, in the Parliament, at the pulpit, in the factory? (2016: 
315) She adds that the issue of ‘where’ also relates to the issue of inside/out-
side, and to the issue of capacities to be and remain outside, where ‘outside’ 
remains an almost entirely positive designation (referring to non-corrupted-
ness, un-orthodoxy, powerful powerlessness) (2016: 315). 
Syntagm “powerful powerlessness” which is related with those that stay “out-
side”, got me thinking in what terms can we describe those who are “inside”, 
i.e. within the system. I take “powerful powerlessness” to be something eman-
cipatory, a raw power of the will to change something, but also as the absence 
of a monopoly of force to produce (implement) this change.
How can we label the power of so-called fourth branch of government, par-
ticularly of an ombudsman? It seems they have “powerless power”. Ombuds-
man has the power because he is anchored in the system, high positioned as a 
state authority of constitutional rank. He has power because he has exclusive 
competence to oversee, inter alia, those who have monopoly of force (state 
violence), such as army, police and intelligence.4 His power rises also from his 
capacity and formal legitimacy to introduce important changes in the way en-
tire state administration functions, because he can contribute to the change of 
values, promotion of social diversity, and advancement of legal and practical 
position of vulnerable groups. At the same time, given his decisions, i.e. rec-
ommendations, are not formally binding nor executive, his power is indeed 
designed as powerless. 
The nature of this powerlessness is in many ways dependent of the level of 
(maturity of) democracy in the state he operates in. In strong democracies, the 
government sees institutional critics of the ombudsman as an instrument to en-
hance its work, while autocracy-prone government often neglects or labels such 
critic as political opposition, avoiding to respond to it with arguments (Glušac 
2018a: 322). In weak states, the government sees critical voices of its own work 
as a critic to the ruling political party, ignoring the standard constitutional prin-
ciple according to which political parties may not exercise power directly or sub-
mit it to their control. At the same time, authoritarian government marginalizes 
the ombudsman, i.e. implementing his recommendations either sporadically 
or concentrating on those on small cases of mala-administration, and ignoring 
those of systematic nature. In such context, the powerlessness of ombudsman’s 
power comes under the spotlight. The ombudsman should be an institutional 
opposition to the authoritarian government, given that the reasons of its es-
tablishment goes directly against the nature of the authoritarian government.
4  Ombudsmen usually have mandate to oversee the work of entire public adminis-
tration, including security apparatus. For more discussion on that, including the exemp-
tions, see Glušac 2018b.
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In that sense, ombudsman is engaged, because he fights for the greater good, 
for citizens’ rights, for administration as citizens’ service, but all that without 
having the prerogatives of force. In those efforts, ombudsman actually relies 
heavily on two actors, who are engaged almost by definition - public intellectu-
als and civil society, while he uses the media as the megaphone of his warnings.
As the power of the ombudsman is derived from the power of his authority, 
and not the authority of power, he constantly moves on the boundary between 
“inside” and “outside”, between powerless power and powerful powerlessness. 
Executive branch is, on the other side, increasingly characterized by worry-
ing “powerful power”. Finally, despite numerous public protests across Europe 
and the world, there is still a large number of citizens who are characterized 
by “powerless powerlessness”, because they choose to remain passive and unin-
terested in wider social and political processes.
When Institutions May Serve as Mechanisms for Channeling 
and Realization of the Goals of Social Engagement 
The state administration system should be designed to be visible, accessible 
and available to citizens. However, as this is often not the case, antagonism 
arises, expressed through mistrust, corruption and it ultimately results in huge 
distance between the administration and citizens. For most citizens, the State 
is represented almost exclusively by the public administration, as they have the 
most frequent contact with it. Thus, any structural problems in the functioning 
of democracy are manifested directly through its work. The centralization of 
the power of executive branch, which results in its de facto “dominance” over 
the parliament, triggers the collapse of the entire system of division of power, 
including through the normative and factual blocking of independent func-
tioning of the judiciary and oversight bodies, as well as through making the 
participation of civil society in designing public policies obsolete. In such cir-
cumstances, there is no substantive oversight of the executive. When, in such 
circumstances, citizens or social groups want to express their dissatisfaction, 
to which political institutions can they turn to, not necessarily in terms of solu-
tions, but for institutional support, in order to see is there an understanding of 
the problems “inside” the system as well? What political institutions can serve 
as mechanisms for channeling and achieving of the goals of social engagement?
Independent (oversight) institutions are logical address, provided they have 
managed to maintain factual independence in such a context. They can indeed 
be characterized by in-built permanent reflexivity over their actions, when 
their leaders truly want to achieve the purpose of their mandate. Precisely be-
cause the effectiveness of independent state oversight institutions – primari-
ly the ombudsman - is notoriously difficult to measure, and because his (om-
budsman’s) decisions are not binding, he must constantly revise his strategy 
of action, must adapt to the changes, both external and internal. On the other 
hand, if the ombudsman wants only to rigorously pursue formal procedures, 
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does not want to think and act outside the box, does not want to be proactive, 
does not want to be brave and tackle difficult issues, but remains inert, proce-
dural and marginalized, then he is everything but engaged.
If we look at some other independent oversight authorities, our expecta-
tions are similar. If, for example, personal and/or confidential data in the pos-
session of state authorities are published in the media, or if state authorities 
refuse to provide information of public importance to citizens or the media, 
then the competent independent institution (e.g. commissioner or similar in-
stitution) should be a channel for the protection of these rights, but may also 
serve to channel initiatives of engaged citizens and groups.
Furthermore, citizens can, individually or acting through civil society or-
ganizations, actually engage to support independent institutions and focus on 
engagement that would have the aim of not changing, but preserving the in-
stitution. An example is the action “I want a Commissioner, not a yeasayer!” 
initiated by the CRTA (Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability) 
in Serbia, to draw attention to the fact that the process of selecting the Com-
missioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection 
must be started and that the criteria of transparency, openness and integrity 
must be respected in the vetting and appointment process. Through a dedicat-
ed web site, all interested citizens had had the opportunity to send a letter to 
the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia with the proposed transpar-
ent criteria compiled by more than 80 civil society organizations.
Conclusion
This article discussed the relationship between the engagement and political 
institutions through the prism of the emergence and development of an om-
budsman. It was demonstrated that its original form was not aimed to serve 
the public interest, but the maintenance of the King of Sweden in power. How-
ever, a later stage of its development brought a strategic shift, in sense that it 
was transformed into an institution that had indeed served to control the gov-
ernment, and not to maintain the King in power.
This article noted that the ombudsman has powerless power. Ombudsman 
has the power because he is anchored in the system, high positioned as a state 
authority of constitutional rank. He has the power because he has exclusive 
competence to oversee, inter alia, those who have monopoly of force (violence), 
such as army, police and intelligence. His power rises also from his capacity 
and formal legitimacy to introduce important changes in the way entire state 
administration functions, because he can majorly contribute to the protection 
and promotion of human rights. At the same time, given his decisions, i.e. rec-
ommendations, are not formally binding nor executive, his power is indeed 
designed as powerless. As the power of the ombudsman is derived from the 
power of his authority, and not the authority of power, it was pointed out that 
he constantly moves on the boundary between “inside” and “outside”, between 
powerless power and powerful powerlessness.
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It was emphasized that the ombudsman’s strategy, but also the way he is 
perceived both by other state authorities and citizens, depends largely on the 
context in which he operates. The ombudsman should be an institutional op-
position to authoritarian rule, because the reasons for its establishment and 
the very mandate go directly against the nature of authoritarian regime. In this 
sense, the ombudsman is engaged, because he is fighting for the common good, 
for citizens’ rights, for the public administration as citizens’ service, at the same 
time with the absence of a prerogative of (physical) power. It was also under-
lined that in these efforts, the ombudsman actually relies mostly on two actors, 
who are engaged almost by definition - public intellectuals and civil society.
The Ombudsman can fulfill his mandate and maximize his influence only 
through in-built permanent reflexivity over his actions and strategies, especially 
when operating in fragile democratic environment. Precisely because his effi-
ciency and effectiveness are so difficult to measure, he must constantly revise 
his strategy of action, must adapt it to the changes, both external and internal. 
If he does not want to do that and opt to be inert, procedural and marginalized, 
then he is everything but engaged; in fact, he then does not serve his purpose.
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Angažman i političke institucije: slučaj ombudsmana
Apstrakt
U ovom radu se na primeru nastanka i razvoja institucije ombudsmana propituje veza izme-
đu angažmana i političkih institucija. Tekst započinjem kratkim osvrtom na glavna teorijska 
viđenja institucija, političkih institucija i institucionalizacije. Potom se koncentrišem na to 
kako se političke institucije menjaju, da bi fokus potom bio usmeren na to da li se one mogu 
menjati društvenim angažmanom, te da li se i kada može smatrati da političke institucije na-
staju angažmanom. S tim u vezi, korišćenjem primera ombudsmana proveravam da li i pod 
kojim uslovima političke institucije i same mogu biti angažovane, odnosno da li su moguće 
institucije kojima je svojstvena kontinuirana refleksivnost spram sopstvenih normi delanja.
Ključne reči: angažman, institucije, političke institucije, institucionalizam, institucionalizacija, 
kontrolna tela, nezavisna tela, ombudsman
